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Measuring the Importance of Labor Market Networks
*
 
We specify and implement a test for the importance of network effects in determining the 
establishments at which people work, using recently-constructed matched employer-
employee data at the establishment level. We explicitly measure the importance of network 
effects for groups broken out by race, ethnicity, and various measures of skill, for networks 
generated by residential proximity. The evidence indicates that labor market networks play an 
important role in hiring, more so for minorities and the less-skilled, especially among 
Hispanics, and that labor market networks appear to be race-based. 
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Racial and ethnic disparities in labor market outcomes are well documented.  There is also strong 
evidence of residential segregation in the United States by race and ethnicity (e.g., Iceland and Weinberg, 
2002), and this segregation is correlated with poor labor market outcomes for minority groups, especially 
the low-skilled among them (e.g., Cutler and Glaeser, 1997).  The existence of residential segregation is 
not itself an underlying economic mechanism for poor labor market outcomes for minorities.  But there 
are at least two theories that can explain how residential segregation by race and ethnicity can contribute 
to these poorer outcomes.   
Perhaps the most famous of these theories is the spatial mismatch hypothesis (e.g., Kain, 1968).  
The essence of the spatial mismatch hypothesis is that blacks disproportionately live in areas with poor 
access to jobs, and that this spatial isolation contributes to poor labor market outcomes for blacks.   
The other theory that can be used to explain the link between residential segregation and labor 
market outcomes is network effects.  In one well-known network effects model, Montgomery (1991) 
specifies a labor market where firms cannot observe the underlying ability of a potential worker but where 
firms can infer something about a potential worker’s ability if (and only if) the firm currently employs 
individuals from that worker’s social network, where social networks are at least partially stratified by 
ability.  Hence, networks act at the establishment level to reduce search frictions.  In equilibrium, 
individuals are more likely to receive and accept wage offers from the firms that employ others in their 
social network, creating stratification across firms on the basis of social networks.  In Montgomery’s 
framework, if social networks are at least partially race- or ethnic-based due to residential segregation, 
and white workers are initially employed at higher rates than blacks and Hispanics, then the existence of a 
larger network of white workers will lead to more job referrals at high wages for whites searching for 
jobs, creating wage disparities between whites and other groups.  Although Montgomery’s model does 
not build in a reservation wage, having an option for remaining out of the labor market would, in his 
framework, lead to employment differentials across groups as well.  Alternatively, Calvó-Armengol and 
Jackson (2007) analyze how labor market networks can translate initial differences in employment rates 
1 and wages between two groups into persistent differences; a natural application is to blacks and whites, 
with networks in which blacks are more connected to other blacks and whites to other whites. 
In previous research, we report evidence suggesting that spatial mismatch is not the mechanism 
by which residential segregation leads to poor economic outcomes for blacks (Hellerstein et al., 
forthcoming).  In particular, we find that poor employment outcomes for low-skilled blacks are not a 
function of a lack of jobs per se where blacks live, but rather that local blacks get these jobs only when 
employers are hiring other black workers.  We suggested that this evidence could be driven by networks 
or by neighborhood effects, and that discrimination against blacks could also potentially play a role.  We 
did not attempt to distinguish sharply between these alternatives to spatial mismatch.  However, we 
concluded that network effects were potentially a better explanation because we found a similar 
relationship for whites to that which we found for blacks—with whites’ employment prospects boosted 
by higher employment of whites where they live, but not by higher employment of blacks.  In short, the 
combined evidence for blacks and whites is consistent with race-based labor market networks.  Moreover, 
in other work we find evidence of substantial workplace segregation by race and ethnicity, evidence that 
is also consistent with race- and ethnic-based labor market networks (e.g., Hellerstein and Neumark, 
forthcoming).  
The potential importance of stratified labor market networks has been noted previously.  
Granovetter (1974) is one of the early sources of evidence on the importance of informal contacts in 
finding employment, and subsequent work has noted the potential for labor market networks to be race-
(or ethnic-) based so that, for example, reliance on informal referrals in a predominantly white labor 
market benefits whites at the expense of other groups.
1  More generally, Ioannides and Datcher Loury 
(2004) review evidence indicating widespread reliance on friends, relatives, and acquaintances to search 
for and find jobs.  They conclude that there is very little racial (black-white) difference in the use of 
informal contacts in job search, but that rates of use of informal contacts are higher for low-educated 
workers compared to high-educated workers, and that there are substantially higher rates of use of 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., the discussion and references in Kmec (2007). 
2 informal contacts for Hispanics than for other groups.  However, none of these studies assesses the 
importance of networks in determining in which establishments people work, and as such none of them 
provides direct evidence consistent with employers relying on informal networks to reduce search 
frictions.  Rather, the reliance on informal referrals documented in this past research simply implies that 
friends, relatives, etc., are a source of labor market information.   
Bayer et al. (2005a) present an analysis testing more directly for network effects.  They use 
confidential data from the 2000 Long Form of the Decennial Census and focus exclusively on workers in 
the Boston area.  In a clever method of inferring whether networks are important in explaining 
employment patterns, they find that two individuals who live on the same census block are about one-
third more likely to work on the same census block than are two individuals who live in the same block 
group but not on the same block.
2  To the extent that informal networks are stronger within the block than 
within the block group, this evidence is consistent with labor market networks affecting hiring.
3
We regard the Bayer et al. paper as providing the most definitive evidence to date suggesting that 
residential geographic proximity affects labor market outcomes, presumably through networks that 
connect people living in close proximity (see also Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004).  Nonetheless, 
there are a couple of limitations of the paper upon which we try to improve in the present study.  First, the 
data contain no information on the exact establishment in which the workers work, so that two individuals 
who work in the same census block may work for different employers, particularly for blocks in the 
central city that contain multiple employers.
4  This is significant limitation with respect to testing the 
hypothesis that labor market networks reduce search frictions on the part of employers, as in 
                                                 
2 For the Boston metropolitan area data they study, a census block corresponds roughly to a city block, and there are 
on average 10 blocks per block group.  (They get similar results using the 10 closest blocks to each block based on 
physical distance.)    
3 Although the baseline rate at which these workers work together is very small to begin with—0.36 percent—this 
effect is estimated for any pair of workers; the authors suggest that the estimate implies a considerably higher 
probability that a worker works on the same block as at least one person who resides on his block. 
4 For example, focusing on central city areas in our sample of urban establishments and their employees, which is 
described below, we find that there are on average 2.58 establishments per block, which is an undercount by what 
we estimate to be about a factor of four, given that we only observe in our data a subsample of establishments.  This 
casts doubt on Bayer et al.’s assumption that workers employed on the same block “work with” one another or 
“work together” (e.g., 2005a, p. 26). 
3 Montgomery’s (1991) model.  Second, Bayer et al. (2005a) focus on the simple link between place of 
residence and place of work, and due to sample size issues (which is partly related to the demographics of 
Boston), cannot fully explore the differential importance of networks by race, and cannot isolate the 
importance of networks for Hispanics or subgroups of Hispanics.  These are groups for whom it is 
particularly important to study networks, not only because of the evidence discussed in Ioannides and 
Datcher Loury (2004) that suggests differential use of networks, but also because of theoretical reasons to 
expect the importance of networks to vary across groups.  For example, if labor market discrimination 
(either statistical or taste-based) by some employers raises search costs for certain groups, such as blacks 
or Hispanics (Black, 1995), residentially-based networks may partially mitigate these search costs by 
helping to identify possible employers on whom to focus a job search.  And to the extent that employers 
stigmatize some groups of workers based on other characteristics associated with race (such as welfare 
use or a criminal record) or ethnicity (such as language ability), informal networks may help to overcome 
statistical discrimination.
5  Note that in these latter cases some degree of residential segregation may help 
disadvantaged groups.   
In this paper we specify and implement a test for the importance of network effects in 
determining the establishments at which people work, using recently-constructed matched employer-
employee data at the establishment level.  We explicitly measure the importance of network effects for 
groups broken out by race (black vs. white), by ethnicity (Hispanic vs. white), and by various measures of 
skill (education and English language proficiency).
6  Because of our data and the resulting methods we 
employ, it is important to note that we are testing for a particular form of labor market networks—
namely, networks that are generated by residential proximity.  In that sense, our analysis parallels Bayer 
et al. (2005a).
7
                                                 
5 The latter explanation follows more directly from Montgomery’s (1991) model. 
6 As Montgomery (1991, p. 1409) notes, since referrals may serve as a screening device, workers with lower 
unobserved ability may be less likely to get referrals.  However, this does not necessarily carry over to these 
observable measures of skill.  
7 We readily note that, in finding that networks are important, we cannot definitively establish that the direction of 
causality runs from place of residence to place of work.  Bayer et al. (2005a) examine this issue in detail and 
conclude that it is likely that networks operate to allow people who live together to find work together. 
4 The measure of labor market networks that we use captures the extent to which employees of a 
business establishment come disproportionately from the same sets of residential neighborhoods (defined 
as census tracts), relative to the residential locations of other employees working in the same census tract 
but in different establishments.  This type of segregation of employees across establishments would arise 
from residential proximity capturing the “network connectedness” that is important to the flow of labor 
market information between specific employers, their employees, and potential hires.
8   
In particular, we first identify all establishments within each census tract.  Since we have matched 
employer-employee data, we have a sample of workers in each establishment, and we know the census 
tracts in which they live.  We then compare how likely it is, on average, that an individual works in the 
same establishment as his/her residential neighbors relative to the likelihood that this would result if the 
establishment hired workers randomly from the geographic areas where all individuals who work in the 
census tract reside.  Residential-based networks would predict that the probability that a worker works 
with neighbors would be higher—and possibly much higher—than would result from the random hiring 
process.  Thus, the difference between these two probabilities provides a measure of the importance of 
residential-based labor market networks, which we rescale into an “effective” measure of the importance 
of networks by comparing this difference to the maximum possible extent of networks that could arise in 
the data (again, relative to randomness), given the distributions of workers across establishments and 
across residential neighborhoods.   
We examine the importance of residential-based networks separately by race, ethnicity, and skill 
in order to establish whether the importance of networks in grouping residential neighbors into 
employment in specific establishments seems to be greater for Hispanics and blacks than for whites, and 
for less-skilled than for more-skilled workers.  Differences by skill might arise because less-skilled 
workers have worse labor market information and may benefit most from networks through a reduction in 
search costs and increased information access.  Race and ethnic differences in the importance of networks 
may exist if networks reduce employer uncertainty about productivity when it is difficult for workers to 
                                                 
8 See Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007) for a model of these connections.  
5 provide signals of productivity because of language, cultural, and educational differences (e.g., Lang, 
1986), or because of statistical discrimination.  In the case of Hispanic workers, in particular, networks 
may compensate for less-developed formal hiring networks in predominantly immigrant communities, 
attributable in part, perhaps, to hiring of undocumented workers.  
We compute our effective measure of the importance of networks unconditionally as well as 
conditional on the industry of employment.  By measuring networks conditional on industry we establish 
that our results really are the result of a process whereby networks help workers gain access to specific 
employers, rather than work opportunities more generally in a given type of industry; the latter would be 
more likely to occur if informal contacts simply tend to provide information about job opportunities in a 
particular sector of the economy. 
  The data we use for this study come from the 2000 Decennial Employer-Employee Database, 
which we have constructed at the U.S. Census Bureau.  The DEED is a large dataset consisting of 
workers matched to their establishment of employment.  The employer-employee matches enable us to 
study directly whether workers employed in the same establishment are likely to live in the same 
neighborhoods.  This is one important dimension in which our work improves upon that of Bayer et al. 
(2005a) who—because they have information only on the Census block in which an employer is 
located—can only ask whether workers both live and work in proximity to one another.  In addition, we 
have national data and focus on race and ethnic differences, whereas they study data for Boston and focus 
mostly on whites.  One drawback of the DEED, however, is that the matching process used in 
constructing the dataset, as well as sample restrictions required to implement our empirical tests, result in 
the disproportionate exclusion of smaller establishments. 
  Overall, we find evidence that labor market networks play an important role in hiring.  For 
blacks, we find that the grouping of workers from the same neighborhoods in the same business 
establishments is about 9 percent of the maximum grouping that could occur, in a sense we define later.  
Networks are also important for whites, although less so than for blacks.  For blacks and whites, labor 
market networks affect employment patterns more for less-skilled than for more-skilled workers, and 
6 because networks are also important within skill groups, the findings do not simply reflect residential 
segregation by skill.  Moreover, the evidence indicates that networks are partly race-based, operating 
more strongly within than across races.  We also find that networks are even more significant for 
Hispanics, for whom the grouping of workers from the same neighborhoods in the same business 
establishments is about 21 percent of the theoretical maximum.  And among Hispanics, networks play a 
larger role for immigrants and those with poor English skills.  Finally, the results conditioning on industry 
indicate that the network effects we find are largely due to the assignment of workers to specific 
establishments rather than simply to industries; this evidence provides support for theoretical models in 
which networks serve to match workers to specific employers. 
II. The 2000 DEED 
The analysis in this paper is based on the 2000 DEED, a data set that matches workers to their 
establishments, which we have created at the Center for Economic Studies at the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census.  We have constructed a similar data set for 1990 and described in detail the process of its 
construction elsewhere (in particular, Hellerstein and Neumark, 2003).  The construction of the 2000 
DEED follows the same procedures.  Thus, in this section we simply provide a brief overview. 
The 2000 DEED is formed by matching workers to establishments.  The workers are drawn from 
the Sample Edited Detail File (SEDF), which contains all individual responses to the 2000 Decennial 
Census of Population one-in-six Long Form.  The establishments are drawn from the Census Bureau’s 
Business Register list (BR) for 2000; the BR is a database containing information for all business 
establishments operating in the United States in each year, which is continuously updated (see Jarmin and 
Miranda, 2002).  The BR is a list of all business establishments with one or more employees operating in 
the United States.  The Census Bureau uses the BR as a sampling frame for its Economic Censuses and 
Surveys, and continuously updates the information it contains.  The BR contains the name and address of 
each establishment, geographic codes based on its location, its four-digit SIC code, and an identifier that 
allows the establishment to be linked to other establishments that are part of the same enterprise, and to 
other Census Bureau establishment- or firm-level data sets that contain more detailed employer 
7 characteristics.      
Households receiving the 2000 Decennial Census Long Form were asked to report the name and 
address of the employer in the previous week for each employed member of the household.  The file 
containing this employer name and address information is referred to as the “Write-In” file, which 
contains the information written on the questionnaires by Long-Form respondents, but not actually 
captured in the SEDF.  We can use employer names and addresses for each worker in the Write-In file to 
match the Write-In file to the BR.  Because the name and address information on the Write-In file is also 
available for virtually all employers in the BR, nearly all of the establishments in the BR that are 
classified as “active” by the Census Bureau are available for matching.  Finally, because both the Write-In 
file and the SEDF contain identical sets of unique individual identifiers, we can use these identifiers to 
link the Write-In file to the SEDF.  Thus, this procedure yields a very large data set with workers matched 
to their establishments, along with all of the information on workers from the SEDF. 
Matching workers and establishments is a difficult task, because we would not expect employers’ 
names and addresses to be recorded identically on the two files.  To match workers and establishments 
based on the Write-In file, we use MatchWare—a specialized record-linkage program.  MatchWare is 
comprised of two parts: a name and address standardization mechanism (AutoStan); and a matching 
system (AutoMatch).  Our method to link records using MatchWare involves two basic steps.  The first 
step is to use AutoStan to standardize employer names and addresses across the Write-In file and the BR.  
Standardization of addresses in the establishment and worker files helps to eliminate differences in how 
data are reported.  The standardization software considers a wide variety of different ways that common 
address and business terms can be written, and converts each to a single standard form.  Once the 
software standardizes the business names and addresses, each item is parsed into components.  The value 
of parsing the addresses into multiple pieces is that we can match on various combinations of these 
components.   
The second step of the matching process is to select and implement the matching specifications.  
The AutoMatch software uses a probabilistic matching algorithm that accounts for missing information, 
8 misspellings, and even inaccurate information.  This software also permits users to control which 
matching variables to use, how heavily to weight each matching variable, and how similar two addresses 
must be in order to constitute a match.  Different match specifications may produce different sets of 
matches.  Matching criteria should be broad enough to cover as many potential matches as possible, but 
narrow enough to ensure that only matches that are correct with a high probability are linked.  Because 
the AutoMatch algorithm is not exact there is always a range of quality of matches, and we therefore are 
cautious in accepting linked record pairs.  We chose matching algorithms based on substantial 
experimentation and visual inspection of many thousands of records.   
The final 2000 DEED is an extremely large data set containing information on 4.09 million 
workers matched to around 1.28 million establishments, accounting for 29.1 percent of workers in the 
SEDF and 22.6 percent of establishments in the BR.
9  We impose additional sample restrictions for our 
analysis, which we discuss following the explanation of our empirical methods in the next section. 
III. Measuring the Importance of Networks 
 
We measure whether and to what extent residential networks play a role in the assignment of 
workers to establishments via an analysis that is based on the percentage of workers in an individual’s 
establishment (i.e., workplace) that comes from the individual’s residential neighborhood.  We compute 
the importance of networks across a variety of subsamples, e.g., all blacks, low-educated blacks, all 
whites, and Hispanics who speak English poorly.  For explication, here we describe in detail how we 
measure the role of race-based residential networks for black workers.  Construction of the network 
measure for other subsamples follows in a parallel fashion.   
We first compute for each black worker in our sample the percentage of black workers with 
                                                 
9 For both the DEED and SEDF we have excluded individuals as follows: with missing wages; who did not work in 
the year prior to the survey year or in the reference week for the Long Form of the Census; who did not report 
positive hourly wages; who did not work in one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia (whether or not the 
place of work was imputed); who were self-employed; who were not classified in a state of residence; or who were 
employed in an industry that was considered “out-of-scope” in the BR.  (Out-of-scope industries do not fall under 
the purview of Census Bureau surveys.  They include many agricultural industries, urban transit, the U.S. Postal 
Service, private households, schools and universities, labor unions, religious and membership organizations, and 
government/public administration.  The Census Bureau does not validate the quality of BR data for businesses in 
out-of-scope industries.) 
9 which that worker works who come from the same residential neighborhood as that worker, excluding the 
worker him or herself.  Because we exclude the individual from this calculation (since it is meaningless to 
say that a person is his or her own neighbor), this requires a sample restriction to establishments where we 
observe at least two black workers.   
  We then average these percentages across all the black workers in our sample to create a 
“network isolation index,” denoted NI
O, which measures the average fraction of a worker’s co-workers 
who are also residential neighbors of that worker.  In using the phrase “network isolation index,” we are 
borrowing from the sociology literature measuring residential segregation (often by race) by defining the 
“isolation index” to be the fraction of a black person’s residential neighbors who are themselves black. 
The superscript “O” on the network isolation index emphasizes that this is the fraction of a black worker’s 
co-workers who are observed in our estimation sample to be residential neighbors.   
To operationalize our network isolation index, we need to define what it means for workers to be 
residential neighbors, which in turn requires us to define neighborhood boundaries.  We define residential 
neighborhoods to be census tracts.  There are a few reasons why this definition seems sensible to us.  
First, census tracts define the boundaries that are traditionally used to measure residential segregation 
(see, e.g., Iceland and Weinberg, 2002).  Second (and related to the first), census tracts are defined by the 
U.S. Census Bureau in order to ensure that the tracts are “as homogeneous as possible with respect to 
population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions,”
10 which in itself is a reasonable 
definition of a neighborhood.  Third, most census tracts are relatively small, so it is reasonable to think 
that it is quite possible that census tract residents have contact with each other, if not “over the back 
fence,” then at parks, schools, churches, stores, etc. 
To provide some idea of the size of census tracts, detailed maps of these tracts for Chicago are 
reproduced in Figures 1 and 2.  For the PMSA (Figure 1), the median census tract was 0.57 square miles; 
the mean was 2.75 square miles.  The smallest census tract was 0.02 square miles, and the largest (in the 
most outlying areas of the PMSA) was 151 square miles.  For the city itself (Figure 2), the median was 
                                                 
10 See http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/Ch10GARM.pdf (viewed April 21, 2008).   
10 0.17 square miles, the mean was 0.26 square miles, the minimum was again 0.02 square miles, and the 
maximum was 8 square miles.  The larger tracts are not problematic.  For the city, the two largest tracts 
are O’Hare Field (the airport) and another tract at the southern edge of the city that is mainly industrial.
11  
After these two, the next largest tract is 3.5 square miles.  The much larger census tracts in outlying areas, 
which are more rural, do not necessarily imply fewer social contacts, because the density of schools, 
churches, etc., is of course much lower.  And these tracts have few residents or establishments and hence 
contribute little to the overall findings.   
There are two reasons why we might observe residential neighbors working in the same 
establishment that have nothing to do with residentially-based labor market networks.  First, access to 
mass transportation alone may lead residential neighbors to work in the same geographic place, although 
not necessarily to work in the same establishments within that place.  Therefore, in establishing 
boundaries for the local area in which workers might be employed, we again use census tracts.  Census 
tracts are generally small enough that it is possible, particularly within urban areas, for individuals to be 
able to walk from any establishment to any other establishment, so in that sense transportation differences 
should not materially affect the distribution of workers across establishments in the tract.   
Second, some clustering of residential neighbors into establishments can occur even if workers 
are assigned randomly to establishments, and we are of course interested in workplace clustering of 
residential neighbors that occurs systematically—i.e., that which is greater than would be expected to 
result from randomness.
12  We therefore consider deviations of NI
O from what would be expected if 
workers from the same residential neighborhood were randomly assigned to any establishment within the 
census tract in which they are employed.   
In particular, we compute the extent of network isolation that would occur simply due to 
                                                 
11 The latter large tract represents the industrial South Deering community.  The census tract is nearly 8 square 
miles, but Lake Calumet, wetlands areas, and the Calumet River comprise over 2 square miles.  The area is largely 
industrial; the region’s first steel mill was located here (http://www.fieldmuseum.org/calumet/SouthDeering.html, 
viewed May 8, 2008).  
12 This is a point that we discuss in some detail in the context of measuring workplace segregation (Hellerstein and 
Neumark, forthcoming), and was noted previously by others (see, e.g., Carrington and Troske, 1997).   
11 randomness, denoted NI
R, by simulating random allocation through Monte Carlo methods.
13  Within a 
census tract, we randomly assign workers to establishments, ensuring that we generate the same size 
distribution of establishments within a census tract as we have in the sample.  We do this simulation 100 
times, and then compute the random network isolation index, NI
R, as the mean over these 100 
simulations.  Not surprisingly, the random network isolation measures are very precise; in all cases the 
standard deviations were trivially small.  We then focus on the difference NI
O − NI
R, measuring network 
isolation above and beyond that which occurs randomly.  This computation requires a second sample 
restriction—that census tracts of employment include at least two establishments with two black workers.  
Otherwise, if the only black workers in a census tract work together in one establishment, then we cannot 
distinguish the effect of residential-based labor market networks from random clustering.  
The difference NI
O − NI
R does not, in and of itself, give us a sense of the importance of networks 
in generating the observed spatial pattern of neighbors working together in establishments.  In particular, 
while NI
R gives us a measure of the minimum amount of clustering of neighborhoods that would happen 
with random assignment of workers to establishments within a census tract, it is also important to know 
what the maximum possible network isolation could be in our data, given the distribution of individuals 
across residential census tracts and given the size distribution (based on matched workers) of 
establishments in each census tract.  To compute this, we use an algorithm that calculates the approximate 
maximum network isolation that could occur if workers were systematically assigned along with their 
neighbors to the maximum extent possible to establishments within the census tract in which they are 
actually observed to work.  For a given census tract in which we have establishments represented in our 
sample, we order the neighborhoods in which workers live by the number of workers from each 
neighborhood.  Beginning with the neighborhood with the greatest number of workers, we assign as many 
workers as possible to one establishment, and any workers who are not assigned to that establishment are 
                                                 
13 For example, consider a census tract that has two establishments in it, each of which is observed to employ two 
black workers.  Assume that two of the black workers come from neighborhood A and two from neighborhood B.  
Even if the four black workers are randomly allocated across the two establishments without regard to the 
neighborhoods in which they live, 1/3 of the time they will be working with a neighbor, so that NI
R will be 1/3. 
12 grouped together and treated as a “new” neighborhood.  We then move to the second largest 
neighborhood from which workers originate (which could be the “new” neighborhood left from the 
previous pass), and assign workers from that neighborhood to the establishment that holds the maximum 
number of these, again therefore keeping neighbors working together in establishments as much as 
possible.  We continue moving down the list of neighborhoods, from those with larger to smaller numbers 
of workers, assigning workers to establishments until all workers are assigned.  We would expect this 
maximum network isolation index to be less than one.
14
This algorithm assigns workers to establishments in a way that simulates the maximum possible 
neighborhood isolation, by mechanically ensuring that it is more likely that workers from large 
neighborhoods will work together.  After assigning workers from the large neighborhoods, it often is still 
likely that we can assign workers from small neighborhoods to work together in establishments, filling in 
the remaining slots in establishments that are not filled by the workers from large neighborhoods.  In 
contrast, if we instead started with smaller neighborhoods, we would be more likely to end up having to 
distribute workers from a large neighborhood across many establishments.
15  We do this for every census 
tract in our sample where workers work, and then compute the weighted average of the maximum 
network isolation in each census tract of employment, weighting by the number of workers we observe to 
be working in that census tract.  We label this maximum network isolation number NI
M.   
Finally, we turn back to (NI
O − NI
R), the difference between our observed network isolation index 
and the random isolation index, and we scale it by the maximum network isolation that can occur beyond 
                                                 
14 For example, consider a census tract that employs nine workers across three establishments, A, B, and C.  
Establishment A employs five workers, while establishments B and C each employ two workers.  Six of the workers 
live in one census tract 1, two live in tract 2, and one lives in tract 3.  Thus, our algorithm proceeds as follows.  We 
first take the workers from the largest neighborhood, tract 1, and put five of them in establishment A, forming a new 
“neighborhood” (call it tract 1A) consisting of the one leftover worker from tract 1.  We then take the two workers 
from tract 2, the next largest neighborhood, and put them in establishment B (the same result occurs if we put them 
in establishment C).  At this point we remain with the single worker from tract 3 and the single leftover worker from 
tract 1A, who have to be assigned in this example to establishment C so as to preserve the size distribution of 
establishments.  In this case, the maximum network isolation index is {(5/9)·1 + (2/9)·1 + (2/9)·0} = 7/9.  To see 
this, the five workers in establishment A are all from the same tract, with the share of co-workers from their census 
tract equal to one.  The same is true for the two workers in establishment B.  And this share is zero for the two 
workers assigned to establishment C.   
15 We have not determined analytically that this always yields the maximum segregation, but experimenting at the 
tract level, we have yet to uncover an algorithm that yields a higher measure.  
13 randomness, or (NI
M− NI






which we call the “effective network isolation index.”  It measures the share of the maximum possible 
network isolation that is actually observed, and provides a natural scaling for the importance of networks 
formed by residential networks in determining the establishments in which people are employed.   
  Like any measure that tries to operationalize the concept of job networks, ours is limited to 
networks that operate among particular members, affecting employment in a particular set of jobs.  
Specifically, our measure only captures the extent to which networks operate to increase the likelihood 
that census tract co-residents work in the same establishment.  To the extent that networks also increase 
the flow of information about jobs nearby the employers of network members, and to the extent that 
networks connect people who live in different census tracts (perhaps because they participate together in 
other institutions or organizations), we will understate the broader importance of labor market networks.   
IV. Sample Characteristics and Restrictions 
  In Table 1 we provide descriptive statistics for the matched workers from the DEED as compared 
to the SEDF.  Column (1) reports summary statistics for the SEDF for the sample of white, black, or 
Hispanic workers who were eligible to be matched to their establishments.  Column (2) reports summary 
statistics for all white, black or Hispanic workers in the full DEED sample—that is, those who we 
successfully matched to their establishments.  The individuals we successfully match in the DEED are 
more likely to be female, to work full time, and to have more education than those in the SEDF.  These 
differences result in part from the matching process, because there are many individuals who meet our 
sample inclusion criteria but for whom the quality of the business address information in the Write-In file 
is poor.  We suspect that the differences in business address information partially reflect weaker labor 
market attachment among less-skilled workers, suggesting that estimates of the importance of networks 
we obtain might best be interpreted as measuring the extent of network isolation among workers who 
have relatively high attachment to the labor force and to their employers.  The last eight rows of the table 
report on the industry distribution of workers.  There is some over-representation of workers in 
14 manufacturing in the full DEED, because larger establishments are more likely to be matched. 
We must make several restrictions to arrive at the samples used for our analysis of network 
effects.  First, we only consider workers who live and work in the same Metropolitan Statistical 
Area/Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA/PMSA).  Second, we exclude from the sample workers 
that have no co-workers in the same establishment who are of the same race or ethnicity as the worker; 
because we are interested in the impact of race- (and ethnic-) based networks on the composition of a 
workplace, we need to observe at least one co-worker of the same race or ethnicity to be able to identify a 
race- or ethnic-based workplace network.  Finally, we retain only workers who work in establishments 
that are located in census tracts with at least one other establishment having two matched workers of the 
same race or ethnic group.  The means for the samples of white, black, and Hispanic workers that we 
analyze are shown in columns (3)-(5).   
In addition to comparing worker-based means, it is useful to examine the characteristics of 
establishments in the DEED once we make our sample restrictions.  Table 2 shows descriptive statistics 
for establishments in the full DEED, and then for each of our final analysis samples.  Because only one in 
six workers is sent the Decennial Census Long Form, it is more likely that large establishments will have 
two matched workers, especially for smaller racial or ethnic groups.  One can see evidence of the bias 
toward larger employers by comparing the medians across the columns for total employment in the 
establishment as recorded in the BR.  (This bias presumably also influences the distribution of workers 
and establishments across industries, where, for example, the DEED itself, and the final analysis samples 
for blacks and Hispanics even more so, over-represent workers in manufacturing establishments.)  The 
establishments corresponding to the full 2000 DEED sample of workers have median employment of 15 
workers.  Once we restrict attention to establishments in metropolitan areas with at least two matched 
white workers, and with at least two such establishments in the census tract, as in column (2), the median 
employment level rises to 35.  Restricting our attention to those establishments in census tracts with 
another establishment having at least two black workers matched, in column (3), median employment is 
even higher, at 154; and in column (4), when we consider the sample of establishments employing two 
15 matched Hispanics in census tracts with at least two such establishments, median employment is 84.  
Later in the empirical analysis we consider the possible ramifications of these consequences of our 
sample selection rules.   
V. Network Isolation Results  
V.1. Results for Whites and Blacks 
Table 3 presents network isolation index results for white and black workers with various levels 
of education.  We begin with white workers, who make up the largest subsample of workers that we use, 
and serve as a good baseline for comparison.  Column (1) reports results for all approximately 1.7 million 
white workers in our sample.  These workers work in 26,470 unique census tracts and live in 46,764 
census tracts.
16  The mean number of establishments in each census tract for which we observe at least 
two white workers in two establishments is 130; the mean number of residents from the same 
neighborhood working in the same census tract is 9.4.  The observed network isolation for the full sample 
of whites is 7.87, indicating that, on average, 7.87 percent of a white worker’s white co-workers live in 
the same census tract as that worker.  When we randomize workers in this sample across establishments 
within census tracts, we recover a random network index of 2.97, less than 40 percent of the observed 
index, and the difference between the two is 4.90.  The maximum possible network isolation that could be 
observed in the data for all white workers is 54.84.  This is well below 100 (perfect sorting of workers by 
residential neighborhoods into establishments), because in many of our census tracts there are 
establishments with more workers observed to work in them than are drawn from any particular census 
tract residential neighborhood.  The maximum is also considerably above the observed network isolation 
measure.
17   
As a result, when we scale up the difference between the observed and random network indexes 
                                                 
16 This is out of a total of about 65,000 census tracts in 2000.   
17 Bootstrap methods show that all of the effective network isolation indices we report are statistically significantly 
different from zero.  Indeed, the estimates of the effective network indices are quite precise, so that, in general, 
substantive numerical differences across columns and tables in reported effective network isolation indexes are also 
statistically significant.  (The confidence intervals bootstrap replications in which we bootstrap the entire sample, 
and then compute each of the measures in the tables that follow.  Thus, we obtain bootstrap replications of the 
differences between any pair of effective isolation indexes within or across tables.) 
16 by the maximum network isolation that occurs beyond randomness, we recover an effective network 
isolation index of 9.45.  That is, approximately 9.5 percent of the maximum amount to which residential 
networks (at the census tract level) could contribute to the sorting of workers into establishments is 
actually observed in the data.  Whether this is a large number or a small one is a subjective matter, of 
course, and there is little with which to compare it given the sparseness of empirical evidence on the 
importance of labor market networks.  To us, however, it seems like a large number suggesting that labor 
market networks are quite important indeed.  
An alternative explanation for the effective network isolation index in column (1) is that there is 
sorting of workers by both neighborhoods and establishments according to skill.  For example, in a census 
tract with two establishments employing workers from two neighborhoods, sorting of this type could 
occur if one establishment hires only less-skilled workers (for example, grocery store cashiers), who tend 
to live together in a neighborhood where housing is cheap, and the second establishment hires only more-
skilled workers (for example, lawyers), who tend to live together in a different neighborhood with more 
expensive housing.
18  Such sorting on skill potentially invalidates a network-based interpretation of 
evidence that people who live near each other tend to work together.
19
In order to evaluate whether the results are driven by skill differentials that lead to both 
residential and workplace skill-based segregation across establishments, in columns (2) and (3) we report 
results separating whites by education level.  Column (2) reports the results for only those whites who 
have at most a high school education.  That is, we take the sample of white workers from column (1) who 
have no more than a high school education and compute the network isolation indexes for those workers. 
Specifically, we first calculate the observed network isolation index (NI
O) by averaging across the sample 
of low-educated white workers the fraction of each individual’s white co-workers who live in that 
                                                 
18 In Hellerstein and Neumark (forthcoming) we report evidence of some segregation of workers across 
establishments based on skill levels.  Bayer et al. (2005b) provide evidence of residential segregation by education 
for blacks.   
19 The Bayer et al. (2005a) study addresses this issue directly, arguing that the sorting of individuals on residential 
location is at the block group level (roughly speaking, 10-block areas), so that a finding that those living on the same 
individual block are more likely to work on the same block (albeit a different one) than are those living on the same 
block group reflects geographic proximity but not sorting.  Evidence they present based on observables suggests 
that, in their analysis, this assumption is likely to be valid.    
17 individual’s residential census tract, regardless of the co-workers’ education levels.
20  This number is 
10.56, somewhat higher than the 7.87 number in column (1).  We then calculate the network isolation 
index for low-educated white workers using the simulated sample from column (1).  The random network 
isolation index is 4.06, also higher than its counterpart in column (1), so that the difference between the 
observed and random index is 6.50.  The fact that both of these numbers are somewhat higher than they 
are when considering all white workers suggests that education is playing some role in driving the 
probability of working with a neighbor.  Finally, to calculate the maximum possible network isolation 
index, we calculate what the index would be if low-educated white workers were able to work to the 
maximum extent possible in establishments with their neighbors of any education level, given the size 
distribution of establishments in our sample, and the size and residential distribution of workers in them.  
This number is 61.62, which is again somewhat higher in column (1).  Taking all of these together, the 
effective network isolation index is 11.29, which is 19 percent higher than in column (1).   
We perform the same exercise for whites with more than a high school degree and report the 
results in column (3).  Across all rows, the resulting measures of network isolation are smaller than in the 
full sample, and the effective network isolation index for this group is 8.21.  Looking across columns (1) 
through (3), the results suggest that networks are somewhat more important for low-educated whites, as 
has been suggested in previous surveys of workers’ use of informal contacts by education.  Returning to 
the original point of this inquiry, however, an equally important conclusion from these results is that 
effective network isolation is about as high or higher once we disaggregate by education, implying that 
the network results we report for the full sample in column (1) are not being spuriously driven by the joint 
sorting of workers by education level into neighborhoods and establishments.     
In columns (4)-(6) of Table 3 we provide parallel results for black workers.  As noted earlier, 
                                                 
20 We could do a more extreme version of this calculation where we also restrict the sample of co-workers to be 
those with low education.  This approach yields qualitatively similar conclusions for the various groups we study, 
but in some cases leads to rather small samples as it causes us to discard some establishments and some census tracts 
in order to meet the data requirements necessary to compute the indexes.  Since we do not expect residential sorting 
by skill to be perfect, there is no reason to preclude labor market information flowing across workers of different 
skill levels.    
18 theoretically the importance of network effects may differ for blacks and whites.  On the one hand, like 
Montgomery’s (1991) model suggests, since whites make up a greater fraction of the working population, 
if networks are race-based one might expect white individuals searching for employment to be able to 
take advantage of a larger network of white working neighbors, making it more likely that whites will 
work together in the same establishment than will blacks, above and beyond what would be predicted by 
random allocation.
21  On the other hand, if labor market networks serve to overcome information 
imperfections more for blacks than for whites, perhaps by helping to lower search costs for blacks related 
to finding non-discriminatory employers, one might expect network isolation to be larger for blacks than 
for whites.  Ultimately, this is an empirical question. 
Column (4) reports results for the sample of black workers.  We estimate that the observed 
network isolation index (NI
O) for all blacks is 5.29, somewhat smaller than for whites, and the random 
network isolation index (NI
R) is 2.58, just slightly below that for whites.  For blacks, the maximum 
possible network isolation index (NI
M) is 31.60, quite a bit below that for whites.  All together, these 
numbers yield an effective network isolation index of 9.35, very close to what we find for whites.  (In 
fact, the effective network isolation index for all blacks (9.35) is not statistically significantly different 
from the estimate for all whites (9.45).)  These full sample results therefore imply that there is very little 
racial difference in the importance of residential-based networks in explaining the assignment of workers 
to establishments.          
In column (5) of Table 3 we report results for blacks who have at most a high school education, 
and in column (6) we report results for blacks who have more than a high school education.  In both 
cases, each of the observed indexes is lower than for whites, but as with the full sample results the overall 
effective network isolation indexes for blacks by education level are substantively similar to those for 
whites, and suggest that residentially-based networks are more important for less-educated blacks than for 
more-educated blacks.  For less-educated blacks, networks generate 11.52 percent of the maximum 
                                                 
21 In our full samples of whites and blacks in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3, blacks have an average of 10 black 
working neighbors, whereas whites have an average of 64 white working neighbors. 
19 amount of sorting by neighborhood that could occur (and this is not statistically significantly different 
from the estimate of 11.29 percent for less-educated whites), and for more-educated blacks, the effective 
index is 7.01 (compared to 8.21 for more-educated whites).  
Overall, the results in Table 3 are in line with other results from the literature, based on quite 
different types of analyses, including: survey results or indirect evidence indicating greater use of 
informal contacts among the less-educated (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004; Topa, 2001); evidence 
based on place of work and place of residence indicating stronger network effects among those with less 
education (Bayer et al., 2005a); and an absence of consistent evidence of race differences in the reported 
use of informal contacts (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004).
22  As noted earlier, though, our evidence 
speaks specifically (and exclusively) to network effects that operate to assign individuals in the network 
to establishments in which other network members work.      
Table 4 presents some additional analyses for black and white workers.  One issue with directly 
comparing the full sample results for blacks and whites is that we know these groups are not similarly 
distributed geographically in the United States.  As a result, our full samples of black and white workers 
may well work in very different local labor markets where one might expect the importance of networks 
to differ as a result of labor market institutions, constraints, or other factors.  Therefore, in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 4 we repeat the analyses for whites and blacks, but restricting the samples to workers 
working in census tracts that are represented by workers in both the white and black samples.  That is, we 
restrict the samples of whites and blacks to those who work in census tracts in which we observe at least 
two establishments employing at least two white workers each, and two establishments employing at least 
two black workers each (where these latter two or more establishments could overlap with those for 
which we observe white employment as well).  For comparison, columns (1) and (2) repeat the full 
sample results for whites and blacks from Table 3. 
The results for the restricted sample of whites are reported in column (3).  The sample restriction 
                                                 
22 Weinberg et al. (2004) study neighborhood effects on hours worked, as a manifestation of network effects, and 
also find stronger effects for the less-educated.   
20 reduces the sample by about one-half, to 845,290 workers, and the numbers of workplace census tracts 
and residential census tracts are also reduced considerably.  So for whites, we are effectively restricting 
the sample to those who work in places where black workers are also working.  The results are different 
than for the full sample of whites.  First, the observed network isolation index is lower at 5.68, and 
interestingly is closer to that for blacks.  And second, the effective network isolation measure is lower 
(7.00 vs. 9.45 in column (1)).
23  Column (4) reports results for blacks.  The effective network isolation 
index for the restricted sample of blacks is 9.08, quite similar to the figure of 9.35 in column (2), which is 
not surprising since between columns (2) and (4) the sample is reduced by fewer than 4,000 workers.
24  
More interestingly, however, the effective network isolation measure for the consistent samples is 30 
percent higher for blacks than for white—9.08 vs. 7.00—suggesting that networks are somewhat more 
important for black than for white workers, at least in places where both are employed.  
Finally, while we have suggested that the network effects we find are race-based, the results we 
have presented thus far are indirect, in that blacks (whites) who live together are more likely than 
otherwise to work together with other blacks (whites) in the same establishment, and to the extent that 
there is pervasive racial residential segregation in the United States (Iceland and Weinberg, 2002), 
networks that are predicated on residential “connectedness” have to be partially race-based.  
Understanding the role of race in driving network effects is extremely important.  Race-based networks 
are central to the work of Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007) in deriving the result that networks can 
perpetuate and exacerbate initial differences in employment between blacks and whites.  Networks that 
operate along racial lines can also potentially help explain the results in Hellerstein et al. (forthcoming) 
that higher local job density for one’s own race affects employment probabilities, but higher job density 
                                                 
23 The difference between the effective network isolation measure in columns (1) and (3) is driven in part by the 
higher maximum isolation measure in the latter case.  This occurs because the observations in column (3) come from 
a much smaller number of tracts with many more establishments and more matched workers per establishment, 
making it possible to achieve a higher maximum amount of network isolation. 
24 We also computed results (but do not report them in a table) for the sample of black workers who work in urban 
establishments (that is, in census tracts that are within the borders of the main city included in the MSA or PMSA).  
The effective network isolation index is 8.18, a bit smaller than for the full sample of blacks.  Of course, one reason 
that the apparent network effects appear a bit weaker in urban areas may be that residential neighborhoods in which 
people interact and exchange job market information are more likely to extend beyond the census tract, given how 
small census tracts are in urban areas (Figure 2). 
21 for the other race does not.
25  This, in turn, suggests that policies that solely address spatial mismatch, by 
attempting to move blacks to areas where more whites live and where more jobs (per person) are located 
may fail to help blacks precisely because network connections are severed.  And finally, race-based hiring 
networks can help explain the establishment-level racial segregation that we have documented in 
Hellerstein and Neumark (forthcoming).   
Therefore, in column (5) of Table 4 we provide more direct evidence on the extent to which 
networks are race-based.  To do this, we carry out the same types of sampling and computational 
procedures used before, except that we consider the relevant set of a black worker’s neighbors and co-
workers to consist of blacks or whites.  We begin by constructing a sample of black workers who we 
observe to work in establishments where at least one other white or black worker is matched.  We then 
further restrict the sample of black workers to those who work in a census tract with at least two 
establishments meeting the selection criterion, that is, which have at least two white or black workers 
matched to them (i.e., at least two blacks, one white and one black, or two whites).  With this sample of 
black workers, we again construct an effective network isolation index, but what is different now is that 
we construct this measure by asking whether our sample of black workers are more likely than would be 
predicted by randomness to work in the same establishment with a neighbor, regardless of the race of that 
neighbor.  To the extent that race plays at least a partial role in determining residentially-based networks, 
the effective network isolation index that results when we measure how likely it is that a black works with 
a neighbor regardless of race should be smaller than when we measure how likely it is that a black works 
with a black neighbor.   
For each black worker in our sample, we first calculate an observed network isolation index by 
averaging across the sample (of black workers) the fraction of each individual’s co-workers who live in 
that individual’s residential census tract, regardless of race.  This number is 3.35, substantially lower than 
the 5.29 number in column (2).  We then calculate the random network isolation index by taking all 
                                                 
25 In that paper, however, the network effects do not necessarily operate among those living in the same 
neighborhood, as we estimated the effect of the density of jobs in a residential neighborhood—whether or not held 
by neighbors—on residents’ employment.   
22 matched white or black workers in these establishments, randomizing them across establishments in that 
sample, and calculating the network isolation index for the black workers in this simulated sample.  The 
random network isolation index is 1.41, leading to a difference between the observed and random indices 
of 1.93.  The fact that both of these numbers are lower than they are when restricting the sample of co-
workers to blacks, in column (2), suggests that race is indeed playing a role in driving the probability of 
working with a neighbor.  To obtain the maximum possible network isolation index, we calculate what 
the index would be if the blacks who make up this sample were able to work to the maximum extent 
possible in establishments with their neighbors of any race, given the size distribution of establishments 
in our sample, the size and residential distribution of workers in them, and the workers’ races.  In 
computing this maximum, we first assign to establishments workers from neighborhoods that have at least 
one black worker, so that we are able to assign as many neighbors of black workers as possible to the 
same establishment.  We then proceed to assign neighborhoods with only white workers to 
establishments.  The resulting maximum network isolation number is 42.34, which is larger than in 
column (2) because we now have many more possible establishments to which we can first assign 
neighbors of black workers in attempting to maximize network isolation for blacks.
26  Taking all of these 
together, the effective network isolation index is only 4.73, which is about 50 percent smaller than in 
column (2), providing direct evidence that residential-based labor market networks have a fairly strong 
race-based component.
27
V.2. Results for Hispanics 
The results from use of referrals suggest that Hispanics use referrals in finding employment much 
more than blacks and whites (Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004).  Immigrants in particular may suffer 
from high search costs in the labor market, both because their limited understanding of U.S. labor markets 
                                                 
26 We now consider nearly three times as many co-workers in the computation of the network isolation index (53 co-
workers, versus 19 when just considering matched black co-workers); however, the mean number of neighbors 
blacks work with increased by only a factor of two (5.7 versus 2.6). 
27 In future work, we plan on trying to determine the extent to which race-based networks are attributable to 
residential segregation by race, as opposed to weaker network connections across than within races for those 
residing in the same neighborhood.    
23 and of English may make it hard for them to search widely in the labor market, and because potential 
employers may have a difficult time inferring the ability of these workers.  Finding employment through 
informal networks of other immigrants and those who speak one’s native language may therefore be 
particularly important for these groups.  There is some indirect evidence consistent with this conjecture.  
of this.  For example, evidence of “enclave effects,” such as the finding that Hispanics with poor English 
skills pay less of a penalty for those poor skills when they live in a county or SMSA with a larger 
Hispanic population (McManus, 1990), might reflect network effects, although it could also reflect higher 
productivity from a greater ability to work with Spanish speakers in the enclave.
28  Munshi (2003) 
presents a more-refined analysis of Mexican immigrants, tying labor market outcomes to a larger local 
population of immigrants from the same origin community.  Patel and Vella (2007) find that new 
immigrants work disproportionately in occupations held by previous immigrants from the same country.  
And our previous work documents establishment-level segregation by English language skills, and 
segregation of Spanish-speaking from non-Spanish speaking poor English speakers (Hellerstein and 
Neumark, forthcoming).  And finally, perhaps the most direct evidence of these types of networks for 
immigrants comes from the work of Massey et al. (1987), who document through both survey and case 
study evidence the importance of networks linking recent and earlier immigrants from the same 
communities in Mexico.    
In this section we turn to an analysis of results for Hispanic workers, paying particular attention 
to Hispanic workers who speak English poorly (or not at all) and Hispanic workers who are immigrants.  
The results are presented in Table 5.  Column (1) presents results for the full sample of Hispanic workers 
(again with the sample restrictions that allow us to construct the network isolation indexes).  The 
observed network isolation index is 11.22, quite a bit larger than for blacks or whites, and the random 
network isolation index is 3.08.  Once we scale the difference between these by the difference between 
the maximum possible network isolation index and the random index, we find that the effective network 
isolation index for Hispanic workers is 21.37, which is more than twice as large as what we find for 
                                                 
28 For a similar type of evidence for Sweden, see Edin et al. (2003). 
24 blacks or whites.    
In column (2) we restrict the sample for which we estimate network effects to Hispanics who self-
report speaking English either “poorly” or “not at all” on the Long Form of the Decennial Census—which 
together we refer to, for simplicity, as the sample of poor English speakers.  For this sample, the observed 
network isolation index is 20.27.  This is very large—it means that, on average, for a poor-English 
speaking worker, 20.27 percent of his or her co-workers who also are poor English speakers live in the 
same census tract!  The random network isolation index is much smaller, at 4.99, and the maximum 
network index is 54.32.  Taken together, these numbers yield an effective network isolation index of 
30.98, meaning that over 30 percent of the maximum possible establishment network isolation by census 
tract of residence for Hispanics who speak English poorly is actually observed in the data.  This is more 
than three times larger than what we find for blacks and whites, and suggests to us that networks are 
extremely important for Hispanics who speak English poorly.  In addition, paralleling our results by 
education level for blacks, the fact that the importance of networks goes up when we focus on those with 
poor language skill implies that the results for Hispanics are not driven by residential sorting on language 
skills.   
  By way of contrast, in column (3) of Table 5 we report the results for the sample of Hispanics 
who report speaking English “well” or “very well.”  The effective network isolation index is 17.47, just 
over half as large as that for Hispanics who are poor English speakers.  This contrast is consistent with the 
idea that networks are extremely important in mitigating the high search frictions that exist for workers in 
the United States whose English language skills are poor, at least with respect to finding employment.   
  In column (4) we report the results for Hispanic immigrants.  The effective network isolation 
index is 27.12, which is quite a bit higher than for all Hispanics.
29  In contrast, in column (5) we report the 
results for non-immigrant Hispanics, for whom the effective network isolation index is 13.62, smaller 
than that of the full sample of Hispanics or any of the other Hispanic subgroups.  To the extent that the 
Hispanic workers in column (4) are most integrated into U.S. society and all have good English language 
                                                 
29 The results are similar for Mexican immigrants, who of course represent the largest share of Hispanic immigrants.  
25 skills, this provides further evidence that what we are capturing in our measure of network isolation is, 
indeed, the important of residence-based networks that reduce search frictions in the labor market.
30   
V. 3. Results for Small Establishments 
We noted earlier that our sample selection rules lead to under-representation of small 
establishments for blacks, and to a lesser extent for Hispanics.  To the extent that network isolation differs 
in a way that is related to establishment size, the different sample compositions of establishments could 
bias our comparisons of the extent of network isolation across racial and ethnic groups.  The results of 
previous research might lead one to expect that thus far we have understated the relative importance of 
networks for blacks and Hispanics.  In particular, evidence such as that reported in Holzer (1998) 
indicates that smaller establishments rely more heavily on informal referrals.  To the extent that these 
referrals are associated with the types of network effects we capture, under-representation of small 
establishments in our black and Hispanic samples results in downward bias in the estimates of the 
importance of networks for minorities.   
Table 6 reports evidence consistent with this type of bias.  In particular, it reports our baseline 
analyses for whites, blacks, and Hispanics, but utilizing a restricted sample of workers employed only at 
establishments with 50 or fewer workers.  Two things are apparent.  First, compared to the corresponding 
estimates in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 and column (1) of Table 5, networks appear much more 
important when we restrict the analysis to small establishments.  Second, and more to the point, the racial 
and ethnic comparisons in Table 6, which are based on much more homogeneous samples with respect to 
establishment size, indicate that networks are much more important for blacks than for whites (an 
effective network isolation index of 38.26 vs. 20.47), and even more so for Hispanics relative to whites.  
Thus, the relative importance of networks for blacks and Hispanics compared to whites is greater than is 
suggested by the analyses of our full samples in Tables 3-5.
31   
                                                 
30 Immigrant status and language skills are strongly related.  A bit under half of the immigrant sample consists of 
poor English speakers, while the non-immigrant sample is nearly entirely good English speakers. 
31 Although not reported in the table, the analysis of blacks and whites for these restricted samples yields evidence 
indicating that networks are race-based, similar to that reported in column (5) of Table 4.  In this case—for the 
26 Networks may be more important determinants of where blacks work than of where whites work 
in part because search frictions are larger for black workers than for white workers, and in part because 
networks serve to mitigate these frictions more for blacks than for whites.  These may be much the same 
forces underlying the greater importance of networks for Hispanics generally, and in particular Hispanics 
who are immigrants or do not speak English well.       
V.4. Network Isolation Conditional on Industry 
In interpreting the results to this point we have presumed that the residential-based networks we 
are measuring operate to help workers find jobs in particular establishments.  As we have discussed, this 
is in line with the theoretical literature on networks (Montgomery, 1991; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 
2007).  However, networks may instead (or as well) serve to help job searchers learn of vacancies in 
certain industries, rather than reducing frictions that prevent workers from matching to specific 
establishments within industries.  For example, someone who works in a retail firm may tell a neighbor of 
job vacancy postings in other nearby retail establishments.  Note that, in principle, this kind of mechanism 
could underlie the results in Bayer et al. (2005a), since they only establish that those who live nearby are 
likely to work in the same narrow geographic area, not the same establishment.   
If networks operate to increase the likelihood that census tract co-residents work in the same 
industry, our calculations to this point might overstate the extent to which networks determine the 
establishment of employment, because the clustering of workers from the same census tract of residence 
in the same industry within a census tract of employment will inevitably lead to some clustering in the 
same establishments.  In this section we explore whether the network effects we find reflect employment 
at the establishment level, or instead only at the industry level.  We do this by constructing “conditional” 
network isolation indexes, simulating network isolation while holding the distribution of workers across 
industries fixed within a census tract of employment.  Intuitively, if a particular residential census tract 
has a lot of workers employed in a specific industry, then the random allocation of workers in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
smaller establishments for which networks are more important—the effective network isolation index falls from 
38.26 in Table 6 to 14.27 when we ignore race, a decline of 63 percent.     
27 simulation will preserve that particular industry concentration, and by subtracting off the network 
isolation that occurs randomly conditional on industry we will isolate the extent to which the clustering of 
census tract co-residents in the same establishments exceeds the clustering that is driven by them working 
in the same industry.
32   
To condition on industry, we modify the procedure used previously to construct the random 
network isolation index (NI
R).  Instead of randomly assigning all workers in a census tract of employment 
to establishments in the tract, holding the size distribution of establishments fixed, we instead ensure that 
workers are also assigned to their industry of employment.
33  We then once again compute the average 
(across the simulations) simulated fraction of co-workers who come from a worker’s own neighborhood, 
denoting this NI





R}]×100  ,      
where NI
R and NI
M are defined as before, without regard to industry.  A conditional effective network 
isolation index of zero (when NI
O = NI
C) would imply that all of the effective network isolation can be 
attributed to networks that help workers find employment in specific industries, but not to establishments 
within industries; that is, above and beyond the clustering of employment of neighbors in the same 
industry, there is no clustering in the same establishment.  Conversely, a network isolation index equal to 
that of the (unconditional) effective segregation measure (when NI
C = NI
R) would imply that all of the 
effective network isolation works to help individuals find jobs in specific establishments within 
industries, and that industry, per se, plays no role in sorting. 
  For brevity, we report in Table 7 results on conditional network isolation only for groups that are 
“low-skilled” in the sense that they either have low levels of education (for whites and blacks) or poor 
English proficiency (for Hispanics).  These are the groups for which networks appear most important.  In 
                                                 
32 Earlier, we noted that we have chosen a specific way to operationalize networks—as affecting the establishment at 
which people work.  Here we are making a different argument.  In particular, having chosen this definition of 
networks, we could be overstating the importance of networks if networks affect the industry of employment, 
because workers employed in the same census tract who work in the same industry are more likely to work in the 
same establishment than are two randomly chosen workers employed in the same census tract.  
33 The industry definitions that we use are the same eight industries reported in Tables 1 and 2: mining; construction; 
manufacturing; transportation; wholesale trade; retail trade; FIRE; and services. 
28 column (1) we repeat the network isolation results for less-educated whites that we previously reported in 
Table 3, column (2).  Then, in column (2), we report results where we condition the random network 
isolation index on industry.  The observed network isolation index, the (unconditional) random isolation 
index, and the maximum network isolation index all remain the same, as the conditional random isolation 
index does not play a role in these calculations.  The simulated conditional index is 5.46, which means 
that when workers are randomly assigned to establishments in the same industry in which they are 
observed to work (and of course the same census tract), on average 5.46 percent of their co-workers will 
come from the same residential neighborhood.  This is higher than the unconditional random isolation 
index of 4.06, so that that the conditional effective network isolation index of 8.86 is somewhat smaller 
than the unconditional effective index of 11.29 reported in column (1).  The difference implies that 
assignment of workers from the same neighborhoods to specific industries within a census tract can 
explain some of the assignment of workers to specific establishments.  However, even after conditioning 
on industry, effective network isolation is still relatively high, and dividing 8.86 by 11.29, we see that 78 
percent of the effective network isolation remains even after we condition on a worker’s industry.  This 
demonstrates clearly that, at least at this level of industry detail, most of the (unconditional) effective 
network isolation for less-educated whites cannot be explained just by a mechanism whereby residential-
based networks serve only to help workers find jobs in the same industries as their neighbors.   
  Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 explore this issue for less-educated blacks.  Column (3) repeats 
the unconditional network isolation indexes from Table 3, column (5), and column (4) reports the indexes 
conditional on industry.  The results are very similar to those for less-educated whites.  The conditional 
random network isolation index of 4.72 as reported in column (4) is somewhat larger than the 
unconditional random index of 3.51, so that the conditional effective network isolation index of 7.95 is 
somewhat smaller than the unconditional index of 11.52.  And, as the last row of column (4) reports, 
assignment of workers to industry alone rather than to specific establishments only explains slightly more 
than 30 percent of effective network isolation, leaving close to 70 percent remaining. 
  Finally, columns (5) and (6) turn to estimates of network isolation for low-skilled Hispanics, with 
29 low skill defined as poor English proficiency.  The results parallel closely the qualitative results for less-
educated whites and blacks.  Column (5) repeats the unconditional results for less-skilled Hispanics 
previously reported in Table 5, column (2).  Column (6) reports the conditional indexes, where the 
conditional effective network isolation of 21.86, when compared to the (unconditional) effective network 
isolation index of 30.98, implies that 71 percent of the assignment of workers from residential 
neighborhoods to establishments within a census tract cannot be explained by industry alone. 
  We conclude from these analyses conditioning on industry that the network isolation results we 
find are largely due to the assignment of workers to specific establishments, providing evidence in 




We use matched employer-employee data for the United States to measure the importance of 
network effects in employment.  The core of our approach is to look at business establishments in a 
census tract, and to ask whether the workers at each establishment are disproportionately clustered in 
particular residential neighborhoods, relative to what we would expect to occur randomly given that all 
workers employed in a particular census tract reside in a subset of census tracts.  Evidence of this kind of 
disproportionate residential concentration of a business establishment’s workforce is consistent with labor 
market networks that connect individuals residing in the same neighborhood to specific business 
establishments.  Because of recent research highlighting the potential importance of labor market 
networks for less-skilled workers in the labor market, and more generally positing that labor market 
networks operate along the lines of race, ethnicity, and skill, we consider separately the importance of 
labor market networks for whites, blacks, and Hispanics, and, within each group, the relative importance 
                                                 
34 We also compute isolation indexes where we condition on a worker’s reported occupation, rather than industry.  
This is useful if one is concerned that our unconditional effective network isolation indexes are driven not by 
networks per se but by the sorting of workers of different skills into different neighborhoods and establishments, 
where occupation is a proxy for those skills.  For less-educated whites, occupation (broken out into six categories) 
explains less than 7 percent of effective network isolation; for both less-educated blacks and low-English-
proficiency Hispanics it explains somewhat more, approximately 17 percent.  All in all, though, the results show that 
sorting by occupation does not come anywhere close to explaining our effective network isolation indexes.  
30 of networks across the skill distribution. 
Our evidence is complementary to an existing body of research on labor market networks and the 
use of informal labor market contacts that are thought to characterize networks.  What is unique about our 
evidence, however, is that it looks directly at potential network effects for workers employed at the same 
business establishment.  Given that many theories of the importance of labor market networks emphasize 
the gains to employers from using their current employees as referrals for other employees, it seems 
particularly useful to test whether network connections among workers—in our case based on residential 
location—actually make it more likely that workers are employed in the same business.   
  We interpret the evidence as indicating that labor market networks play an important role in 
establishment-level employment.  For both whites and blacks we find that the grouping of workers from 
the same neighborhoods in the same business establishments exceeds by a factor of more than two what 
we would expect to occur randomly.  For whites, we find that network isolation is about 9.4 percent of the 
theoretical maximum amount of grouping that could be found in the data, and most of our analyses 
indicate that labor market networks are more important for blacks than for whites.  For both whites and  
blacks, labor market networks appear more important for workers who have low levels of education—a 
high school degree or less—than for more-educated workers.  There is also some evidence that networks 
are more important in small establishments.  Finally, our results provide evidence that networks operate to 
some extent along racial lines, as the link between residential location and the establishment of 
employment is stronger for blacks when we consider only co-workers of the same race.  As emphasized in 
recent theoretical work by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2007), race-based labor market networks may 
prevent the convergence of black and white labor market outcomes—and can even exacerbate the 
differences.   
We also find that networks are more important for Hispanics than for blacks or whites, and 
among Hispanics, networks are especially important for immigrants and those with poor language skills.  
The results for Hispanics give credence to the idea that informal labor market networks may be 
particularly important for those workers who are not as well-integrated into the labor market, and for 
31 whom employers may have less reliable information.   
  As the discussion of the data requirements for this study indicates, it is difficult to obtain 
evidence on labor market networks.  Although the notion of networks has been around for many decades, 
there are only a handful of studies providing evidence that networks affect labor market outcomes, and 
this study is the first to document the importance of labor market networks operating within 
establishments.  Aside from further attempts to construct or obtain data to study the kind of network 
effects we examine in this paper, a number of other important questions remain.  First, along what other 
dimensions of social interactions—aside from residence—do networks operate to cause individuals to 
work together, and what types of networks are most important?  Among the possibilities are schools,
35 
religious institutions, and community groups, as well as existing places of employment (from which 
workers may move to other jobs).  Second, what are the consequences of labor market networks that 
match workers in a network to specific establishments?  Do those who find employment in establishments 
with others in their networks actually have better labor market outcomes as a result?  Third, are minorities 
who have network relationships mainly with other minorities disadvantaged relative to those that have 
network relationships with whites?  Fourth, do networks cross racial boundaries fluidly within residential 
neighborhoods—suggesting that residential segregation, per se, is the key source of race-based 
networks—or are there racial barriers to networks even within neighborhoods in which blacks and whites 
live?  The answers to these questions may provide clues regarding how important it is for individuals, 
communities, and other institutions to foster network relationships so as to improve economic outcomes, 
and what types of networks are most effective.  The data demands for answering many of these questions 
are daunting.  
                                                 
35 Indeed Bayer et al. (2005a) show that the type of network effects they study appear to be stronger for those with 
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 Figure 1: Census Tracts, Chicago PMSA 
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Figure 2: Census Tracts, Chicago 
 






Table 1: Individual-Level Means for Preliminary and Final Analysis Samples, White, Black, and Hispanic 
Workers 
 2000  SEDF, 
workers 





























Female .46  .50  .50  .63  .46 
Married .58  .61  .62  .42  .57 
White .81  .86  1.0  -  - 
Black .09  .06  -  1.0  - 
Hispanic .09  .07  -  -  1.0 
Full-time .78  .82  .83  .84  .83 










High school diploma  .31  .29  .26  .28  .25 
Some college  .33  .36  .36  .41  .28 
BA .15  .17  .22  .14  .07 
Advanced degree  .06  .07  .09  .05  .03 
Speaks English well  .97  .92  1.00  .99  .80 
Immigrant .08  .06  .03  .09  .49 








































          
Industry:          
Mining .006  .004  .003  .001  .002 
Construction .081  .048  .041  .007  .040 
Manufacturing .207  .257  .266  .242  .353 
Transportation .075  .052  .053  .074  .052 
Wholesale .047  .052  .054  .025  .050 
Retail .210  .212  .195  .146  .212 
FIRE .070  .068  .072  .079  .043 
Services .304  .306  .316  .425  .249 
N 13,456,402  3,924,714  1,675,412  97,967  110,235 
Notes: In addition to restricting by race and ethnicity, the three additional restrictions imposed in going 
from column (2) to columns (3) through (5) are: the individual must live and work in same MSA/PMSA; 
there must be at least two workers matched to establishment; and there must be at least one other 
establishment with two matched workers in the census tract.  
 Table 2: Establishment-Level Descriptive Statistics for Preliminary and Final Analysis Samples 






   2000 DEED, final  2000 DEED, final  2000 DEED, final 
DEED  for blac s  for H spanics 
  )  ( (1)  (2 (3)  4) 
Total employment 













15  35 




1  3 
Establishment  size:        
1-25  .65  .39 .11 .18 
26-50  .11 .16  .15  .20 
51-100  .14 .20  .10  .17 
101+  .62 .45  .10  .22 
Industry:       
Mining  002 .003 .004  .003 .  
Construction  .  .013 .053  078  .070
Manufacturing  .  .226 .310  133  .186
Transportation  .  .077 .051  050  .052
Wholesale  .  .039 .060  067  .074
Retail  .   231 .266  284  .265 .
FIRE  .  .082 .049  081  .077
Services  .303  .272  331 .209  .
In  MSA/PMSA  1.0 1.0  .792  1.0 
Census  region:       
North  East  13 .015 .053  .048 .0  
Mid  Atlantic  .135  .148 .122 .084 
East North Central  04  .088 .199  .232  .2  
West North Central  39  .010  .092  .089  .0
South  Atlantic  2 .05 .166  .157 .33 2 
East South Central  .050  .043  .081  .002 
West South Central  .102  .090  .136  .218 
Mountain    012 .084  .061  .057 .
Pacific    061 .448  .142  .135 .
Payroll ($1000) 



























.16  .14 
Multi-unit   .61 .40  .51 .80  
establishment 
N 1,254,718  329,943  21,872  30,343 
Notes: See notes to Table 1.  
  
Table 3: Network Isolatio
 Whites 
n for Whites and Blacks, Overall and by Education   
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 (1)  (2)  (4)    (6)  (3)  (5)
Network isolation index, o ed, NI 6   5.29   bserv
O 7.87 10.5 6.51   7.42 3.90 
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R 4.06  2.58  1.97     2.97  2.41  3.51 
NI
O − NI
R 4.90 6.50  4.10 2.71 0   3.9 1.93 
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI 4 61.62  52.32 31.60  0  29.55
M 54.8 37.4  
Effective network isolation,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/( − NI
 R)]·1
9.45 11.29  8.21 9.35 11.52 
NI
 M  00 
7.01 
            
N 1,675,412  1,11 561,370  97,9 4,042  67  38,754    59,213
# place of work tracts  26,470  25,690 26,299  4,490 4,301  4,350 
# residential tracts  46,764  43,469  45,666  21,623  13,598  18,299 
Mean establishments/tract  129.6  114.5  137.2  22.2  19.8  23.8 
Mean matched  kers/establ 24 18.6  15.6  wor ishment  38.4  .4  45.4  20.5 
Mean num
from same tract of residence 
9 ber of workers in tract of employment  9.4 11.2  8.5 2.6  2.   2.4 
Notes: The calculation is described in the text.  NI
O is the average fraction of a worker’s co-workers (i.e., excluding the worker) who re
same census tract as the worker, averaged across all workers in the sample.  NI
R is the average fraction that is simulated to occur randomly






 Table 4: Network Isolation for Blacks and Whites, for Consistent Samples o
   
f Establishments, and Ignoring Race   











w rk isol o  based on 
hites  blacks a
  hite ack All w s  All blacks  Whites  Blacks  All bl s 
  ) (5)  (1   (3) (2)  (4)    
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O 87  9      3.35  7. 5.2 5.68 5.25
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R   97  8  1.41  2. 2.5 1.48  2.55 
NI
O − NI
R 4.90  1      1.93  2.7 4.20 2.71
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 84 0      42.34 54.  31.6 61.43 32.35  
Effective network isolation,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI
 M − NI
 R)]·100 
5  5      4.73 9.4 9.3 7.00 9.08  
          
N  12 7 60,456  1,675,4   845,290 97,96   94,210   1  
# place of work tracts        16,818 26,470  0 4,49 4,122 4,122  
# residential tracts  46,764  3  49,586  21,62 42,533  21,459 
Mean establishments/tract  .6    125.7  129 22.2 229.7  23.0 
Mean matched workers/establishment  .4  6  52.7  38 18. 46.6  17.7 
Mean number of workers in tract of employme
from same tract of residence 
nt  .4  6      5.7  9 2. 11.4 2.6
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
 
 Table 5: Network Isolation for Hispanics, Overall and by Skill and Immigrant Status 













  ) )  (4)    (1   (2 (3)  (5)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O 2 7 .89 15.27  11.2  20.2   8   7.25 
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R   3.08  4.99  2.59  3.78  2.39 
NI
O − NI
R 8.14 15.28 9    6.30 11.4 4.86 
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 41.15 2 38.65 4  38    54.3    46.1 .06
Effective network isolation,  
 O   R  M NI
 R)]·100  [(NI − NI )/(NI  − 
21.37 8 7.47 2  1    30.9   1  27.1 3.62
          
N 110,235  22,538  87,697  54,529  55,706 
# place of work tracts  59 683 043 680  5,0  3,   5,  4, 4,754 
# residential tracts  16  703  ,920  ,802  1 20,7 7, 19 13 6,548 
Mean establishments/tract  9.7  7.6  57.6  6.1  5 6 6 53.4 
Mean matched workers/establishment  9.1  6.9  9.7  7.5  10.7 
Mean number of workers in tract of employment  2.7 3.3  2.5 2.9 
from same tract of residence 
2.5 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. 
 Table 6: Network Isolation for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics Working in Small Estab
 Whites 
lishments (50 employees or less) 
Hispanics  Blacks 
 (1)  (2)    (3)
Network isolation index, observed, NI
O .76 12   15   .76  22.79
Simulated random network isolation index, NI
R   4.49  4.43  5.74 
NI
O − NI
R 11.27 8.33  1   7.05
Maximum possible network isolation index, NI
M 59.54   4    26.20 0.71
Effective network isolation,  
[(NI
 O − NI
 R)/(NI
 M − NI
 R)]·100 
20.47   4    38.26 8.75
      
N  7, 8,706  52  52 430  21,9
# pl e of  ork tr cts  ac w a 22,162  1,097  2,093 
# residential tracts  700  5,30 43, 8  8,019 
Mean establishments/tract  6.0  7.4  6 23.0 
Mean matched workers/establishment  3.3  2.7  2.7 
Mean number of workers in tract of employment from act  3.9 1.4     s tr ame 
of residence 
1.8
Notes: See notes to Table 3.
  






illed Workers, Conditional on Industry  
Whites, high school or 
less 




Cond.  Uncond.  Cond.  Uncond.  Cond. 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
tw  isolation index, 
observed, NI
10.56 10.56  7.42  7.42 20.27  20.27  ork
O
Sim  
is  index, NI   






etwork 4.06 4.06 
Sim lated conditional network 
isolation index, NI
C
 5.46  4.72   9.48  u
NI  NI
C  5.10  2.69   10.78 
O −
Maxim m sible rk 
isolation inde








 M − NI
 R)]·100 









 M − NI
 R)]·100
 8.86  7.95   21.86 
NI
 O   
S  
unexplained 
78.46  69.01   70.57  hare of effective isolation  
Se  to Table 3.  There are  hites with a high school degree or less; 38,754 blacks with a high 
school degree or less; and 22,538 Hispanics with poor English skills.  The industries are mining; construction; 
manufacturing; transportation and warehousing; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; 
and services.   
  
e notes 561,370 w